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Cyberattacks on both databases and critical infrastructure have threatened public and private sectors. Ubiq-
uitous tracking and wearable computing have infringed upon privacy. Advocates and engineers have recently
proposed using defensive deception as a means to leverage the information asymmetry typically enjoyed by
attackers as a tool for defenders. The term deception, however, has been employed broadly and with a variety
of meanings. In this paper, we survey 24 articles from 2008–2018 that use game theory to model defensive
deception for cybersecurity and privacy. Then we propose a taxonomy that defines six types of deception:
perturbation, moving target defense, obfuscation, mixing, honey-x, and attacker engagement. These types
are delineated by their information structures, agents, actions, and duration: precisely concepts captured
by game theory. Our aims are to rigorously define types of defensive deception, to capture a snapshot of the
state of the literature, to provide a menu of models which can be used for applied research, and to iden-
tify promising areas for future work. Our taxonomy provides a systematic foundation for understanding
different types of defensive deception commonly encountered in cybersecurity and privacy.
CCS Concepts: rSecurity and privacy→ Economics of security and privacy; Network security;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Cybersecurity, privacy, game theory, deception, taxonomy, survey, mov-
ing target defense, perturbation, mix network, obfuscation, honeypot, attacker engagement
1. INTRODUCTION
“All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we
must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when
we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far
away, we must make him believe we are near.”—Sun Tzu, The Art of War
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Deception has played an important role in the history of military combat. More gen-
erally, deception is commonplace in adversarial or strategic interactions in which one
party possesses information unknown to the other. In this paper, we are motivated by
recent deception research in psychology, criminology, economics, and behavioral sci-
ences.
1.1. Deception Across Disciplines
1.1.1. Military Applications. Deception and secrecy demanded significant attention dur-
ing World War II and the Cold War [Whaley 2016; Bell and Whaley 2017]. But increas-
ing globalization and the proliferation of communication technologies have recently
created further challenges for mitigating deception. Increasing availability of informa-
tion has led not only to more knowledge but also to worse confusion [Godson and Wirtz
2011]. National defense requires detailed study of military-relevant deceptions such
as advanced persistent threats carried out by state actors [Bodmer et al. 2012].
1.1.2. Psychology and Criminology. Research in psychology and criminology suggests
that humans have poor abilities to detect deception [Bond Jr and DePaulo 2008; Vrij
et al. 2008]. One approach to address this shortcoming focuses on interview techniques.
It has been shown that detection rates can be improved by tools that increase cognitive
load by asking suspects to recall events in reverse order, to maintain eye contact, or to
answer unexpected questions. Some of these have been incorporated into the investiga-
tive protocol known as the Cognitive Interview for Suspects (CIS) [Geiselman 2012]. A
second approach uses physiological indicators. For instance, the Guilty Knowledge Test
(GKT) prompts a suspect with a list of items—for example, a set of articles found at
the scene of a crime—and measures the suspect’s physiological responses to each item
[Lykken 1959]. Signs of arousal in a suspect suggest that the suspect possesses guilty
knowledge, because the articles are irrelevant to an innocent person.
1.1.3. Cybersecurity. Deception is used in cyberspace interactions for both defense and
attack. Examples of malicious deception include email phishing, man-in-the-middle
attacks, and deployment of sybil nodes (nodes with forged identities) in a social net-
work. Cybersecurity professionals have developed various defenses against these de-
ceptions. For instance, the field of adversarial machine learning protects data analysis
algorithms against injection or manipulation of data by attackers [Zhang and Zhu
2015; 2017], and the field of trust management evaluates whether distributed nodes
should trust possibly-malicious signals [Pawlick et al. 2015; Pawlick and Zhu 2017b].
Examples of defensive deception include moving target defense [Zhu and Bas¸ar 2013],
honeypot deployment [Carroll and Grosu 2011], and the use of mix networks [Zhang
et al. 2010].
1.1.4. Privacy Advocacy. Recently, privacy advocates have designed technologies for In-
ternet users to obfuscate the trails of their digital activity against ubiquitous tracking.
Privacy advocates argue that developments such as third-party tracking and persis-
tent cookies have not been sufficiently regulated by law. Therefore, there is a need for
user-side technologies to provide proactive privacy protection. One example is Track-
MeNot, a browser extension that periodically issues random search queries in order to
undermine search engine tracking algorithms [Howe and Nissenbaum 2009]. Another
example is CacheCloak, which protects location privacy by retrieving location-based
services on multiple possible paths of a user. An adversary tracking the requests is not
able to infer the actual user location [Meyerowitz and Roy Choudhury 2009]. These
are instances of deception that is designed for benign purposes.
1.1.5. Behavioral Economics. In economics, the area of strategic communication quan-
tifies the amount of information that can be transmitted between two parties when
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communication is unverifiable [Crawford and Sobel 1982; Kartik 2009]. Communica-
tion can be evaluated both strategically and physiologically. One recent paper analyzes
patterns of eye movement and pupil dilation during strategic deception [Astyk et al.
2010]. At the same time, research in behavioral economics finds that sometimes eco-
nomic agents choose not to deceive, even when it is incentive-compatible [Gneezy 2005;
Hurkens and Kartik 2009; Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi 2013]. Subjects that exhibit
so-called lying aversion choose to maximize their payoffs less frequently when it re-
quires a lie than when it requires a simple choice. This points towards the influences
of morality and ethics on deception.
1.1.6. Economic Markets. In broader economics literature, [Akerlof and Shiller 2015]
argues that many markets admit equilibria in which deceivers exploit those who are
vulnerable. Akerlof and Shiller describe these interactions in politics, pharmaceuti-
cals, finance, and advertising. They use email phishing as an analogy for any kind of
deception in which an informed “phisherman” exploits the lack of knowledge or the
psychological vulnerabilities of a group of “phools.” The essential insight is that op-
portunities for deception will be exploited in equilibrium. Across all six disciplines,
deception involves interaction, conflict, rationality, and uncertainty.
1.2. Cybersecurity and Privacy
Major cybersecurity incidents in the past ten years include breaches of Home Depot
in 2014, insurance company Anthem Inc, in February of 2015, and the US Office of
Personnel Management later that year. The ten years from 2005 to 2015 featured over
4000 (publicized) data breaches [Edwards et al. 2016]. During the same ten years, cy-
ber attacks also affected physical space. The power grid in Ukraine, Iranian nuclear
centrifuges, and an American water dam twenty miles north of New York were all
infiltrated. Since then, new attack vectors such as the Mirai botnet have highlighted
the potential to turn Internet of things (IoT) devices into domestic cyber weapons. At
the same time, IoT devices have raised new privacy concerns. Smartphones and wear-
able electronics combine to collect sensitive data which can predict “a user’s mood;
stress levels; personality type; bipolar disorder; demographics” [Peppet 2014]. Advo-
cates have responded by designing innovative privacy enhancing technologies (PETs)
and trying to formalize and defend appropriate definitions of privacy [Nissenbaum
2004].
1.3. Defensive Deception
Firewalls, cryptography, and role-based access control, although essential components
of any security strategy, are unable to fully address these new cybersecurity and pri-
vacy threats. Adversaries often gain undetected, insider access to network systems.
They obtain information about networks through reconnaissance, while defenders lack
an understanding of the threats that they face.
Deception is crucial to counteract this information asymmetry. Consider the follow-
ing definition [Mahon 2016]:
To deceive def= to intentionally cause another person to acquire or continue to
have a false belief, or to be prevented from acquiring or cease to have a true
belief.
This definition is broad, which matches the diversity of applications of defensive de-
ception to cybersecurity and privacy. On the other hand, the breadth of the term de-
ception limits its depth. Finer-resolution definitions are necessary to design deception
techniques for specific purposes.
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While affirming the breadth and variety of types of deception in our area, we aim to
tease out the distinctions between these types. To some extent, this is already present
in the literature; authors use specific terms such as moving target defense, perturba-
tion, and obfuscation to refer to different types of deception. Nevertheless, the meaning
of these terms is not completely clear. For instance, what is the difference between per-
turbation and obfuscation? We attempt to answer this and other questions by proposing
a taxonomy of defensive deception for cybersecurity and privacy.
1.4. Game-Theoretic Taxonomy
We are interested in understanding the question “What are the various types of de-
ception?” from the viewpoint of quantitative science. Since deceptive interactions are
strategic confrontations between rational agents, an appropriate quantitative science
is game theory. Game theory “can be defined as the study of mathematical models of
conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers” [Myerson 1991].
Each player in a game makes decisions that may influence the welfare of the other
players. Game theory applies naturally to strategic and adversarial interactions in cy-
bersecurity and privacy1. It has been used in a variety of cybersecurity contexts. A few
application areas include intrusion detection systems [Alpcan and Basar 2003], adver-
sarial machine learning [Zhang and Zhu 2015], and communications jamming [Basar
1983]. Applications in physical security include the ARMOR system for Los Angeles
airport security [Pita et al. 2008] and the PROTECT system for patrol routes in the
port of Boston [Shieh et al. 2012].
Game theory offers a quantitative framework that can model the information struc-
ture, actors, actions, and duration of the various types of defensive deception. As a
systems science, it models the essential, transferable, and universal aspects of defen-
sive deception. In doing so, it attempts to build up a science of security.
Of course, game-theoretic models are useful only insofar as they capture real fea-
tures of cyberspace phenomena. Therefore, we need to apply appropriate models to
each type of deception. This is precisely the motivation to develop a game-theoretic tax-
onomy of deception: to identify the features of the various types of deception that must
be captured by game-theoretic models.
1.5. Contributions and Related Work
Figure 1 gives a conceptual outline of the paper. We present the following principle
contributions:
(1) We review the game-theoretic models most commonly used to study cybersecurity
and privacy (Section 2).
(2) We survey the contributions of 24 recent (2008–2018) articles to the field of game-
theoretic models of defensive deception (Section 3).
(3) We develop a taxonomy that defines specific types of deception, including moving
target defense, perturbation, mixing, obfuscation, honey-x, and attacker engage-
ment. We also show how the game-theoretic concepts of private information, actors,
actions, and duration capture the essential differences between types of deception
(Section 4).
(4) We discuss promising areas for future research. These include mimetic decep-
tion, theoretical advances, practical implementations, and interdisciplinary secu-
rity (Section 5).
1All of the works surveyed in this paper use “non-cooperative game theory.” In non-cooperative games, “the
players’ choices are based only on their perceived self-interest, in contrast to the theory of cooperative games”
in which groups of players make decisions together in coalitions. Still, “non-cooperative players, motivated
solely by self-interest, can exhibit ‘cooperative’ behavior in some settings” [Fudenberg and Tirole 1991].
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Fig. 1. We begin by discussing deception across several different disciplines, and then focus on defensive
deception in cybersecurity and privacy. Then we describe a set of game-theoretic principles which are utilized
in literature in this area, and review the literature. Finally, we create a taxonomy which defines each type
of deception, and we identify areas for future work.
Table I. Players, Types, Actions, and Utility Functions for Three Games
Players P Types Θ Actions A Utility U Duration T
Stackelberg game Typically L : aL ∈ AL L : UL(aL, aF ) One-shot
between leader L uniform F : aF ∈ AF F : UF (aL, aF ) leader-follower
and follower F structure
Nash game Typically V : aV ∈ AV V : UV (aV , aW ) Simultaneous
between semetric uniform W : aW ∈ AW W : UW (aV , aW ) move structure
players V and W
Signaling game S has S : aS ∈ AS S of each type One-shot
between sender S multiple R : aR ∈ AR θ ∈ Θ : UθS(aS , aR) sender-receiver
and receiver R types θ ∈ Θ R : UR(θ, aS , aR) structure
All of the literature that we review 1) studies cybersecurity or privacy, 2) employs
defensive deception, and 3) uses game theory. This strictly constrains the scope of the
paper. Notably, we have excluded papers that use deception for physical security (e.g.,
[Pita et al. 2008; Shieh et al. 2012], etc.). We have also excluded studies of malicious
deception and the defensive methods that aim to mitigate it.
Surveys of game theory and cybersecurity can be found in [Roy et al. 2010; Manshaei
et al. 2013; Do et al. 2017], but these do not focus on deception in particular. Deception
in the context of military applications has been well studied by Barton Whaley and
coauthors [Bell and Whaley 2017; Rothstein and Whaley 2013; Whaley 2016]. Some
of these works include taxonomies. Specifically, [Rothstein and Whaley 2013] makes a
distinction between “hiding the real” and “showing the false” which we build upon in
our taxonomy. Scott Gerwehr and Russell Glenn add that some deceivers aim to inject
noise: randomness or intense activity that slows an adversary’s ability to act. We find
analogous aims in perturbation or obfuscation for the purposes of privacy. They also
distinguish between static and dynamic deception. We adopt this distinction, since it
motivates modeling efforts using one-shot or multiple-interaction games [Bennett and
Waltz 2007].
Our work is also related to [Rowe and Rrushi 2016], which categorizes methods of
deception according to techniques such as impersonation, delays, fakes, camouflage,
false excuses, and social engineering. Finally, the present taxonomy can be compared
and contrasted to those developed by Kristin Heckman et al. [2015]. One of these tax-
onomies breaks down malicious deception by stages including design of a cover story,
planning, execution, monitoring, etc. Another distinguishes between defensive decep-
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Fig. 2. Stackelberg games consist of a leader L and a follower F. L chooses an action aL, and F chooses
a best response BRF (aL). L takes this best response into account when choosing aL. Stackelberg cyber-
security models often consider the defender to be a leader, and the attacker to be a follower, based on the
assumption that the attacker will observe and react to strategies chosen by the defender.
tions based on whether they enable defensive visibility or restrict attacker visibility2.
To the best of our knowledge, however, none of the related works develops a taxonomy
based on game-theoretic distinctions. Our taxonomy distinguishes between different
types of deception precisely in order to enable accurate game-theoretic modeling of each
type.
2. REVIEW OF GAME-THEORETIC MODELS
In this section, we introduce some of the most common game-theoretic models used
in defensive deception for cybersecurity and privacy: Stackelberg, Nash, and signaling
games. Table I summarizes the components of the games3. These components define
the structure of the taxonomy that we develop in Section 4.
2.1. Stackelberg Game
Stackelberg games [1934] are perhaps the most fundamental game-theoretic interac-
tions. They are characterized by the following details.
(1) Players: P = {L,F} , where L is a leader and F is a follower.
(2) Actions: The actions for player L are given by aL ∈ AL. Figure 2 shows a 2 × 2
game in which A = {u, d}, and u denotes moving up, while d denotes moving down.
Player F has actions aF ∈ AF = {t, b} , where t denotes top and b denotes bottom.
(3) Utilities: After both players move, L receives utility UL (aL, aF ) , and F receives
utility UF (aL, aF ) .
In Stackelberg games, the follower moves after observing the leader’s action. Often,
cybersecurity models take the defender as L and the attacker as F, assuming that the
attacker will observe and react to defensive strategies.
Stackelberg games are solved backwards in time. Let P(S) denote the power set of
the set S. Then let BRF : AL → P(AF ) define a best response function of the follower to
the leader’s action. BRF (aL) gives the optimal aF to respond to aL. The best response
function could also include a set of equally good actions. This is the reason for the
2Several other works contribute to the effort to create a taxonomy of deception. Michael Handel makes
a distinction between deceptions targeted against capabilities and those against intentions [Bennett and
Waltz 2007], which we do not explore in the present work. Oltramari and coauthors define an ontology of
cybersecurity based on human factors [2014], but this is more focused on trust than deception. Finally, Neil
Rowe [2006] describes a taxonomy of deception in cyberspace based on linguistic theory.
3All three games are static games (where we take one-shot interactions to be static although they are
not simultaneous). In addition, while Stackelberg and Nash games typically do not include multiple types,
Bayesian Stackelberg and Bayesian Nash games do allow multiple types.
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Fig. 3. Nash games are interactions with prior commitment. In this case, the dashed line indicates that W
does not know which node describes the game, because she does not know which move V has chosen.
power set. The best response function is defined by
BRF (aL) = arg max
aF∈AF
UF (aL, aF ) . (1)
Based on anticipating F ’s best response, L chooses optimal action a∗L which satisfies
a∗L ∈ arg max
aL∈AL
UL (aL, BRF (aL)) . (2)
Then, in equilibrium, the players’ actions are (a∗L, a∗F ) , where a∗F ∈ BRF (a∗L) .
2.2. Nash Game
While in Stackelberg games players move at different times, in Nash games [1950]
players move simultaneously. More precisely, Nash games are games of prior commit-
ment, in which each player commits to his or her strategy before knowing the other
player’s move. Typically, two-player games of prior commitment are shown in matrix
form. Figure 3, however, gives a tree diagram of a two-player game in order to show
the difference between this game and a Stackelberg game. Players V and W act si-
multaneously, or at least without knowing the other player’s action. The dashed line
connecting the two nodes for W denotes that W does not know which node the game
has reached, because she does not know which move V has chosen.
The concept of Nash equilibrium requires each player to choose a strategy which is
optimal given the other player’s strategy. Let BRV : AW → P(AV ) be defined such
that BRV (aW ) gives the set of actions for V which optimally respond to W ’s action
aW . Let BRW be defined similarly. Then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium [1950] is
given by a pair (a∗V , a∗W ) such that
a∗V ∈ BRV (a∗W ) , (3)
a∗W ∈ BRW (a∗V ) . (4)
Nash equilibrium often requires players to choose actions according to probability dis-
tributions. These strategies are called mixed strategies. Mixed strategies implement
the basic idea of randomizing allocations of defense assets in order to avoid leaving
vulnerabilities open to an attacker.
2.3. Signaling Game
Signaling games, like Stackelberg games, are two-player dynamic interactions (Fig. 4).
Signaling games typically label the players as sender S and receiver R. The sender has
access to some information unknown to the receiver. This is called the sender’s type
θ ∈ Θ. The receiver only learns about the type based on the sender’s action. For this
reason, the sender’s action (here aS) is referred to as a message. The message need not
correspond to the sender’s type.
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Fig. 4. The figure depicts a signaling game in which a sender S, who has access to private information,
transmits a message to a receiver R. The message is not verifiable, so R does not know the underlying infor-
mation with certainty. In separating and partially-separating equilibria, however, it is incentive-compatible
for S to transmit a message that at least partially reveals his private information.
𝑝(𝑠) 𝜎𝐿 𝑜 𝑠) 𝜎𝐹 Ƹ𝑠 𝑜)
prior leakage
secret
inference
𝑠 𝑜 Ƹ𝑠
perturbation
observable estimate
Fig. 5. In the Information Sharing Framework from Shorki [2015], a user hides a secret s by releasing an
observable o according to the channel probability σL(o | s). The adversary uses inference σF (sˆ | o) to obtain
estimate sˆ. This is a Stackelberg game, because the adversary knows the perturbation mechanism when he
designs an inference attack.
In this example, the set of types of S is Θ = {θB , θM}, where θB represents a benign
sender, and θM represents a malicious sender. Let p(θ) denote the prior probability
with which S has each type θ ∈ Θ. The utility functions depend on type. UMS (aS , aR)
and UBS (aS , aR) give the utility functions for malicious and benign senders, respec-
tively. UR (θ, aS , aR) gives the utility function for the receiver when the type of S is θ,
the sender message is aS , and the follower action is aR. R forms a belief γ (θ | aS) that
S has type θ given that he sends message aS ∈ AS . To be consistent, this belief should
be updated in accord with Bayes’ law. A strategy pair in which S and R maximize their
own utilities, together with a belief which is consistent, form a perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (PBNE) (c.f. [Fudenberg and Tirole 1991]). In some PBNE, S can cause R
to form a specific false belief.
3. LITERATURE SURVEY
In this section, we survey existing literature in game-theoretic approaches to defensive
deception for cybersecurity and privacy. Tables III-IV in the appendix list the papers,
which we now discuss from top to bottom.
3.1. Perturbation
The first set of papers study privacy that is obtained by perturbing sensitive data.
Chessa et al. [2015] model the interaction between a set of users who contribute data
in order to identify mechanisms by which the learning agent can improve the quality of
its estimation. The users have two strategic variables: whether to contribute at all, and
the level of precision to use if they do contribute. They face a trade-off between privacy
and the benefit of contributing to data analysis. The paper takes this benefit—although
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possibly difficult to quantify—to be a non-monetary interest in data as a public good.
Chessa et al. study both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations of users. The
interactions between these populations of users are modeled as Nash games. After
finding that the equilibrium in these games is worse than the population-optimal be-
havior due to the selfishness of the agents, the authors consider a mechanism for the
data collector to improve the equilibrium. They find that an analyst can shift the equi-
librium of the game towards more accurate estimation by imposing a minimum level
of precision in the strategy space of the users. The paper studies computation of the
average of a data set as a foundation for more complex statistics [Chessa et al. 2015].
Shokri [2015] also addresses the issue of data privacy for users who send private
information to an untrusted source. Shorki’s work concerns two types of privacy, dif-
ferential privacy and distortion privacy. Differential privacy obtains a guaranteed limit
on the amount of information that users leak to an attacker, but does not tell the user
the actual level of privacy achieved. Distortion privacy is a measure of the actual error
of the attacker’s inferences based on the information that is leaked. The calculation of
this metric, however, requires that the attacker have prior knowledge before making
an observation. Using a non-zero-sum Stackelberg game, Shokri develops a model for
joint distortion-differential privacy. Figure 5 depicts the interaction. The user leads
by choosing a protection mechanism. The attacker follows, designing an inference at-
tack and aiming to minimize user privacy. The inference attack is the best response to
the user’s protection mechanism. The author develops a linear program to obtain the
equilibrium [Shokri 2015].
Alvim et al. [2017] study information privacy within the setting of information the-
ory. Specifically, their paper formulates information transmission and leakage using
quantitative information flow. A sender possesses a secret, which a defender only
knows with some prior probability. The sender transmits the secret through a channel,
and the channel leaks some information to the adversary. Using this information, the
adversary forms an a posteriori belief about the secret. A quantity called the poste-
rior vulnerability of the secret quantifies the degree of the adversary’s knowledge. The
quantification can be the entropy of the posterior distributions, although a general
convex function can also be used. Alvim et al. observe that the expected utility be-
comes convex, rather than linear, in the mixed-strategy probabilities. For this reason,
they call the game an information leakage game [Alvim et al. 2017]. This formulation
makes useful connections to the abundant tools available in information theory.
Theodorakopoulos et al. [2014] address the issue of privacy for location-based ser-
vices (LBS). The authors emphasize that human locations are not found at discrete
spatial-temporal points, but rather follow a trajectory. Theodorakopoulos et al. propose
user-centric location privacy preserving mechanisms (LPPMs) that send LBS pseu-
dolocations to protect not only the privacy of past and future locations, but also transi-
tions between locations and locations between LBS queries. As a Bayesian Stackelberg
game leader, the LPPM strategically sends a perturbed pseudolocation to the LBS to
protect its exact real location. Privacy provided by the LPPM is measured by the error
with which an adversary deduces the real location of the target. Quality is determined
by how much the altered location data from the LPPM affects the functionality of the
LBS. Both privacy and quality values are computed for users that prioritize 1) pro-
tecting past locations or 2) protecting future locations. The authors’ contribution is to
improve upon “trajectory-oblivious” LPPMs. They evaluate the LPPM using a set of
mobility traces for taxi cabs in the San Francisco Bay area [Theodorakopoulos et al.
2014].
Of course, a large body of literature studies the use of perturbation to protect pri-
vacy (especially as quantified by differential privacy). We have only focused on the
subset of this literature that uses game theory. We also note that perturbation is very
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Fig. 6. The moving target defense designed in [Zhu and Bas¸ar 2013] updates the configuration of a system
each round based on learning the risk of attack that the system faces.
similar to obfuscation, which we survey in Subsection 3.3. Section 4 defines the dif-
ference between the two types and explains why we have categorized some papers as
perturbation but others as obfuscation.
3.2. Moving Target Defense
Next, we discuss papers that study moving target defense. Moving target defense in-
vokes concepts of agility, changing attack surfaces, and random configurations. Two
different game-theoretic concepts are often used to model moving target defense. They
differ in whether time is considered explicitly. One approach is to model randomness
using mixed strategies, with the implicit understanding that new realizations from a
random variable will be performed over time. A recent paper by Rass et al. notes a
shortcoming of this approach: utility functions based on mixed strategies do not inher-
ently capture the cost of switching from one pure strategy to another over time [2017].
The second approach to moving target defense is to use Markov decision processes.
In Markov decision processes for moving target defense, the defense configuration is
considered a state, and switching costs can be modeled explicitly.
Sengupta et al. [2018] consider the placement of intrusion detection systems (IDS)
in a cloud-based architecture. Two cloud servers and a cloud controller are connected
to the Internet via a physical router. An attacker who may be located either outside or
inside the network attempts to gain access. The network designer is able to place a lim-
ited number of IDS. The design problem is where to place them. In order to limit the
knowledge of the attacker, these placements are performed probabilistically. Hence,
this is a moving target defense. First the defender chooses a probability distribution
for the locations of the IDS. Then the attacker observes this distribution and he chooses
which system to attack. The interaction is modeled by a Stackelberg game with mixed
strategies. The game can be solved by a mixed-integer linear program, although ulti-
mately the most efficient formulation is as a mixed-integer quadratic program, using
a branch-and-cut algorithm. One interesting contribution of this paper is that the au-
thors include a concise taxonomy of moving target defense. They break moving target
defense into four categories: shifting the exploration surface, detection surface, attack
surface, or prevention surface. This could be useful to add a layer to the taxonomy
proposed in the present paper.
Zhu and Bas¸ar [2013] use Markov decision processes to model moving target defense
for network security. An attacker and defender play a series of zero-sum Nash games in
which the defender chooses the arrangement of systems with various vulnerabilities,
and the attacker selects an attack path that depends for its success on the arrangement
of the vulnerabilities. See Fig. 6. Tools from control theory are used to analyze the
dynamics of the multiple-round interaction. Zhu and Bas¸ar show that the steady states
of the learning dynamics correspond to equilibrium points in the Nash games. The
authors illustrate the game and resulting dynamics with a numerical example. This
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Fig. 7. Deceptive routing [Clark et al. 2012] protects traffic routed from source s1 to sink k1 and source
s2 to sink k2 from jamming attacks. Player 1 sends real traffic with volume aR1 to legitimate node s
R
1 , but
also sends decoy traffic with volume aD1 to deceptive node s
D
1 . Player 2 has a similar strategy. With some
probability, the adversary attacks the deceptive rather than the real traffic.
work points towards modeling the interaction between the attacker and defender as a
stochastic game in which the defender would attempt to minimize the total risk over
the whole game, rather than optimizing his risk at each individual stage [Zhu and
Bas¸ar 2013].
Feng et al. [2017] study moving target defense using a combination of a Markov
decision process and a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of an
abstract resource such as a network asset. The defender begins each turn by claiming
a moving target defense strategy, which lasts for T periods. The defender controls a
Markov decision process in which the states represent security configurations of the
system. Then the attacker follows by choosing one state to attack. If the attack is
successful, then the attacker obtains a reward. The problem can be expressed in min-
max form, which the authors show can be reduced to simply a minimization problem.
They obtain an algorithm which hasO(|V |2 log |V |) complexity, where |V | is the number
of valid states. One insight from the paper is that the defender’s cost can be reduced
more easily by increasing the degree of the switching graph than by reducing the costs
of switching [Feng et al. 2017].
3.3. Obfuscation
The third set of papers relates to hiding valuable information using external noise.
Clark et al. [2012] model a network in which information is sent from a source to a
destination over multiple nodes. See Fig. 7. The interaction is modeled using a Stack-
elberg game in which the defender leads by choosing the flow rates of deceptive and
real traffic. The attacker observes these flows, and then follows by choosing a path to
attack. The authors consider situations in which sources do and do not cooperate to ob-
fuscate their traffic. They model the compounded pathway congestion that comes with
the addition of fake data, and the possibility that information sources may take into
account the delays being experienced by other nodes in the network when determining
their own data pathways and flow rates. A simulation illustrates that altruistic sources
improve node functionality. Clark et al. suggest that future work can study other mea-
surements of the efficacy of deception and an incomplete information model in which
nodes are only partially informed about the attacker’s cost and utility functions [2012].
Zhu et al. [2012] build upon this idea in order to consider both 1) deceptive routing,
and 2) strategic choices of flow rates. In order to model both of these conflicts, the
authors formulate multiple-player Stackelberg games in which the defender leads and
the attackers follow. The routing game requires an extension to Stackelberg games
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Fig. 8. Freudiger et al. [2009] study pseudonym swapping for location privacy in vehicle ad hoc networks.
As Vehicle 1 turns left at its first intersection, it can swap pseudonyms with Vehicle 2 and Vehicle 3. At its
second intersection, it can swap with Vehicles 4, 5, and 6. If these other vehicles have recently swapped, how-
ever, they have little incentive to swap again. Thus, the interactions become multiple-player, simultaneous-
move games.
to allow N + 3 players, where N is the number of attackers. Zhu et al. quantify the
effectiveness of the mechanism using a metric called value of deception, a ratio of the
utility achieved with and without the use of deception. Simulations illustrate that
defender utility decreases approximately asymptotically in the attacker’s budget, and
increases approximately linearly in the number of hops. Future work could include the
introduction of learning to similar algorithms, as well as the application of the model
to multiple routing pathways [Zhu et al. 2012].
While [Clark et al. 2012; Zhu et al. 2012] apply obfuscation to security, this type of
deception also applies directly to privacy. Two recent papers by Pawlick and Zhu [2016;
2017a] model the long-run impact of obfuscation technologies such as TrackMeNot
[Howe and Nissenbaum 2009] (a browser add-on which issues randomized search en-
gine queries to obfuscate a user’s search profile) and ScareMail [Grosser 2014] (which
appends security-sensitive words to the end of every email in an effort to undermine
mass surveillance). These tools add irrelevant data (e.g., randomized browser searches)
to relevant data (e.g., real browser searches). The first paper develops a Stackelberg
game in which the leader is a machine learning or tracking agent and the follower is a
user. The learning agent has the option to promise a level of differential privacy protec-
tion. The user reacts to this level, and chooses whether to obfuscate the data himself.
Under certain conditions, it is incentive-compatible for the learning agent to promise
some level of privacy protection in order to avoid user obfuscation [Pawlick and Zhu
2016]. The second paper extends this scenario to multiple users through a mean-field
game model. In a mean-field game, each user responds to the average obfuscation of
the field of other users. This extended model predicts a threshold of perturbation be-
yond which users will adopt obfuscation in a cascading manner. The paper also identi-
fies conditions under which obfuscation does not motivate privacy protection from the
learner but only results in data pollution [Pawlick and Zhu 2017a]. These papers could
benefit from future measurements of users’ preferences in experimental or empirical
settings.
3.4. Mixing
Techniques for both security and privacy use the idea of mixing in order to prevent
linkability. Zhang et al. [2010] study anonymity of the Tor network. When information
is sent over Tor, it passes through three nodes before reaching its destination, in an
attempt to make the entry and exit nodes unlinkable. Zhang et al. point out that since
connectivity on Tor is volunteer-based, attackers could collude to link the entry and
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exit nodes. They propose gPath, which operates on three principles: 1) an exit-eligible
node should not be considered for the entry, 2) the middle node should have equal or
greater bandwidth than the entry node, and 3) the exit node should be chosen based on
the bandwidths of the entry and middle nodes. The authors construct utility functions
for the user and attacker. The players use these functions to compute best responses
to each other’s strategies in four rounds. This is different from Nash equilibrium, since
the strategies do not necessarily converge to mutual best responses. Simulations per-
formed on a snapshot of the Tor network from 2010 suggest that gPath reduces the
probability of a successful attack [Zhang et al. 2010].
The idea of mixing can also be applied to cyber-physical systems such as vehicle ad
hoc networks (VANETs). Freudiger et al. [2009] use locations called mix zones for loca-
tion privacy in VANETs. Vehicles in these networks communicate using pseudonyms
in order to achieve anonymity. Nevertheless, a constant trace of communications from
a single pseudonym creates a link between a vehicle’s origin and destination. One
technology proposed to overcome this linkability is pseudonym swap in mix zones
(Fig. 8). At locations such as intersections, multiple vehicles simultaneously exchange
their pseudonyms, so that the identities of vehicles that enter the swap zone can only
be linked with the identities of vehicles that exit the swap zone with some proba-
bility. Freudiger et al. note that this is a strategic interaction, because swapping in-
volves some cost. Selfish actors may decline to swap. Nash equilibrium is used since
pseudonym swapping is a simultaneous interaction. Freudiger et al. consider both
complete and incomplete information games. In the incomplete information games,
each player is unaware of the privacy loss which the other players have incurred since
their last pseudonym swap (and thus their willingness to swap again). Interestingly,
VANET nodes tend to swap pseudonyms more often when pseudonym swapping is
expensive than when it is cheap [Freudiger et al. 2009]. One challenge is that swap
locations are presumably those in which communication is most necessary and should
not be interrupted (such as at an intersection).
Lu et al. [2012] address this dilemma by proposing pseudonym changes at social
spots, where many vehicles often stop for a period of time. Small social spots, e.g.,
stoplights, are places where vehicles stay briefly. Large social spots, such as parking
lots, are places where vehicles remain for longer duration. A privacy mechanism—
Key-insulated Pseudonym Self-Delegation (KPSD)—is proposed. Authorized keys
(pseudonyms) for each vehicle are kept in a secure location by a Trusted Authority
(TA), usually at the car owner’s home. The TA loads onto the OnBoard Unit (OBU)
a set of temporary keys before each new trip. As in [Freudiger et al. 2009], the ad-
versary is global (i.e., has full access to radio network safety messages that provide
vehicle time, location, speed, content and pseudonym) and external (only listening in
on conversations, not engaging in vehicle sabotage), with access to the vehicle’s OBU.
This KPSD model is also unique compared to other models because of its ability to
prevent theft. Since pseudonyms are changed at social spots and since the keys are
not kept with the vehicle but instead with the TA, a thief cannot generate temporary
keys needed for vehicle operation. Lu et al. incorporate a game-theoretic argument
(based on Nash equilibrium) to discuss the scenarios under which KPSD is incentive-
compatible [Lu et al. 2012].
3.5. Honey-X
By honey-x, we refer to deception which uses techniques named with the prefix honey
(e.g., honeypot, honeynet, honeybot, etc.). In many implementations of these tech-
niques, defenders have a limited capacity to monitor honeypots, and attackers have
constrained time and available technologies in order to detect honeypots. Therefore,
game-theoretic trade-offs arise. Carroll and Grosu [2011] study a network in which a
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Fig. 9. Mohammadi et al. [2016] use signaling games to model the use of fake avatars as a type of honey-x.
The avatars observe suspicious or non-suspicious activity from other user accounts in the network, and must
form a belief about whether the other users are legitimate accounts or compromised accounts. The goal of
the avatars is to correctly report compromised accounts, while avoiding false positives.
defender can disguise honeypots as real systems (or reveal them as honeypots) and
real systems as honeypots (or reveal them as real systems). The goal is to make at-
tackers waste resources attacking honeypots and avoiding real systems. In the pro-
posed signaling game, the defender is the sender and the attacker is the receiver. The
equilibrium concept is PBNE. Because the defender never wants to reveal the system
type to the attacker, the game does not support any separating equilibria. Carroll and
Grosu analyze both pooling and hybrid (partially separating) equilibria. Hybrid equi-
libria demonstrate cases in which the defender has an incentive to partially reveal the
actual system type [Carroll and Grosu 2011].
This work by Carroll and Grosu has inspired several other papers. C¸eker et al. [2016]
build on this model for honeypot deployment in the setting of distributed denial-of-
service attacks. This paper features one major difference: in [C¸eker et al. 2016], mes-
sages are costly, while in [Carroll and Grosu 2011] they are costless. In other words,
defenders in [C¸eker et al. 2016] must pay a cost to make normal systems appear to be
honeypots or honeypots appear to be normal systems. Because of this cost, separating
equilibria emerge in some parameter regimes. Another feature of [C¸eker et al. 2016] is
that the authors propose a parameter valuation method to obtain the utility functions
using existing security evaluations. The authors derive a complete set of closed form
solutions.
Mohammadi et al. [2016] use signaling games to model the decision processes of a
fake avatar that is defending a social network from attack. Figure 9 depicts the model
using the signaling game formulated in Fig. 4. A user in the network may be normal
or compromised. It interacts with an avatar in suspicious or not suspicious ways, and
this interaction is taken to be a signaling-game message. The fake avatar observes
this interaction, and forms a belief about the real type of the user. The avatar then
decides whether to raise an alert. [Mohammadi et al. 2016] is not a cheap-talk game,
because raising an alert is assumed to be more costly than not raising an alert. But
this extra cost of raising an alert applies regardless of the actual user type, so it does
not take the form of a “lying cost,” as is the case in [C¸eker et al. 2016]. Due to this
different structure, the game in [Mohammadi et al. 2016] does not support separating
equilibria. In the pooling equilibria, the fake avatar alerts the system of an attack if
the prior probability that the user is an attacker is sufficiently high [Mohammadi et al.
2016].
Pawlick and Zhu present a final perspective on honeypot deployment using signal-
ing games [2018]. They use a cheap-talk game with binary type, message, and action
spaces. The unique element, however, is a “detector” which gives off probabilistic evi-
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Fig. 10. Hora´k et al. [2017] model attacker engagement using a one-sided partially observable stochastic
game. From left to right, states correspond to layers of a network. In the states at the top of the figure,
the attacker is undetected. When the IDS detects the attacker, the state moves to the bottom of the fig-
ure. Defender actions are shown in italics. The defender decides when to engage the attacker and gather
information rather than eject the attacker.
dence when the sender misrepresents his type. They call this model a signaling game
with evidence [2018; 2015]. This model is capable of nesting cheap-talk signaling games
(c.f., [Crawford and Sobel 1982]) and games of verifiable disclosure (c.f, [Milgrom 1981])
as special cases. The relevant equilibrium concept is an extended version of PBNE.
The authors find that the ability to detect honeypots always improves the utility of the
attacker, but surprisingly sometimes also improves the utility of the defender. This
suggests that in certain parameter regions, it is advantageous for the defender to use
imperfect deception. They also find that detectors which prioritize high true-positive
rates over low false-positive rates encourage truthful signaling. Finally, they show that
receivers prefer equal-error-rate detectors [Pawlick et al. 2018].
Pı´bil et al. [2012] and Kiekintveld et al. [2015] create a different type of imper-
fect information model called a honeypot selection game. The honeypot selection game
classifies targets into different levels of importance. These are assigned corresponding
utility values for the attacker, and the defender plays to minimize the attacker value.
The defender disguises the honeypots by choosing the utility value that they appear
to have. A configuration of the network is represented by a vector of the real values
of each real machine, and the simulated values of the honeypots. The Bayesian Nash
equilibrium can be found using a linear program. The authors examine the defender’s
optimal strategy and equilibrium utility as a function of the number of honeypots that
he deploys. Keintveld et al. also study an extension of the game that allows attack-
ers to probe potential targets before choosing whether to attack. The probe returns
accurate or inaccurate responses with some probability. The game is again zero-sum,
and the analysis proceeds using a linear program [Pı´bil et al. 2012; Kiekintveld et al.
2015].
3.6. Attacker Engagement
Most game-theoretic models of deception are either static games (such as simultane-
ous move Nash games) or single-shot dynamic games (such as Stackelberg games or
signaling games). But some initial work has investigated multiple-period games. We
use “dynamic” to refer to games having multiple periods, and we call these interactions
attacker engagement.
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[Zhuang et al. 2010] create a multiple-period signaling game that concerns deception
and resource allocation. This paper is about homeland security in general, and only
briefly mentions computer security. Still, it is interesting due to its technical setup
and insights. In each period, the defender chooses to invest in either short term “ex-
pense” or long term “capital” investments. In addition, the defender chooses how much
of this to reveal to the attacker using a signal. The defender may signal truthfully or
deceptively, or she may act secretively, i.e., not reveal any information. The attacker ob-
serves the defender’s signal, updates his belief, and chooses whether to attack. Games
are constructed in which the attacker can and cannot observe previous defender in-
vestment strategies. The games are solved through backwards induction. In several
cases, the defender can deceive the attacker, often by mimicking the strategy of the
opposite defender type. For example, when the attacker cannot observe previous de-
fender strategies and has a high cost of attack, the defender can deter an attack by
choosing an expensive short term defense rather than long term investment. Zhuang
et al. also discuss remaining challenges involved in the area of equilibrium selection
[2010].
Durkota et al. [2015] use attack graphs to represent attacker strategies and de-
velop network-hardening methods to increase security. They propose a Stackelberg
game in which the defender leads by placing honeypots in the network. The attacker
follows and has knowledge of the number of honeypots (not their identities). Attack
graphs are used to capture the adversary’s multiple-round strategies. Durkota et al.
argue that vulnerability databases can be used to contruct a menu of possible attack
graphs which the adversary can employ, assuming that the defender knows which sys-
tems, software, etc. are present in the network. The defense strategy is obtained using
Markov decision processes. One contribution of the paper is an efficient algorithm to
solve the Markov decision process using policy search with pruning [Durkota et al.
2015]. For the purposes of the classification in Section 4, it is interesting to note that
the paper builds upon the foundation of honeypot deployment, but adds the dynamic
element of multiple-round attack graphs.
Hora´k et al. [2017] model the penetration of an attacker into a network using a
one-sided partially observable stochastic game. Unlike most approaches to network
security, Hora´k et al. consider the defender rather than the attacker to be the informed
player. Instead of ejecting an attacker immediately, the defender decides how long
to observe the attacker in order to gather information. Figure 10 depicts the set of
states and transitions. The attacker compromises the network in layers and chooses
when to exfiltrate data without knowing for sure whether she has been detected. In
equilibrium, the defender’s optimal strategy is to keep the attacker inside the network
while the attacker is confident that he has not yet been detected, and to eject the
attacker from the network otherwise. The authors also evaluate the robustness of the
solution if the attacker does not know the capabilities of the IDS. While this paper
studies a simplified network structure, it offers an uncommon analysis of the optimal
strategies for a powerful and observant defender [Hora´k et al. 2017].
4. TAXONOMY
The U.S. Department of Defense has highlighted the need for “the construction of a
common language and a set of basic concepts about which the security community can
develop a shared understanding” [MITRE 2010]. More specifically, the term deception
has been employed broadly and with a variety of meanings. A “common language and a
shared set of basic concepts” would allow deception researchers to better collaborate. It
would also further the development of cybersecurity and privacy as a science. Finally,
a precise taxonomy would allow game theorists to carefully select models that capture
the unique features of each different type of deception.
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Fig. 11. We use the term mimesis to signify the creation of a specific false belief. In this example, a defender
makes an adversary believe that a database exists when, in fact, it does not exist.
Fig. 12. We use the term crypsis to refer to preventing an adversary from acquiring a true belief. In this
example, a defender hides the true existence of a database from an adversary.
In Section 3, we sorted deception into six different types: perturbation, moving target
defense, obfuscation, mixing, honey-x, and attacker engagement. In this section, we
first give general descriptions of the six types. Then we construct a taxonomy which
precisely defines each of the types using game-theoretic principles.
(1) In the area of privacy, deception can limit leakage of sensitive information though
the use of noise. This type of deception is often called perturbation (Subsection 3.1).
(2) Deception can limit the effectiveness of attacker reconnaissance through tech-
niques such as randomization and reconfiguration of networks, assets, and defense
tools. This is called moving target defense (Subsection 3.2).
(3) Deception can waste effort and resources of attackers by directing them to decoy
targets rather than real assets, and can protect privacy by revealing useless infor-
mation aside real information. This is called obfuscation (Subsection 3.3).
(4) Deception can use exchange systems such as mix networks and mix zones to pre-
vent linkability. We call this type of deception mixing (Subsection 3.4).
(5) Deception can draw attackers towards specific systems (such as honeypots) by dis-
guising these systems as valuable network assets. In order to include honeynets,
honey-users, etc., we call this type of deception honey-x (Subsection 3.5).
(6) Deception can use feedback to dynamically influence attackers over an extended
period of time, in order to waste their resources and gather intelligence about them.
We call this attacker engagement (Subsection 3.6).
4.1. Detailed Definition of Each Type of Deception
A taxonomy is “a collection of controlled vocabulary terms organized into a hierarchi-
cal structure” in which each term “is in one or more parent/child (broader/narrower)
relationships to other terms in the taxonomy” [NISO 2005]. Traditionally, each parent
is called a genus, and each child is called a species [Chisholm 1911]. Each species is
demarcated from other members of its genus by a specific difference. The most fine-
grained species in a taxonomy are sometimes called the infimae species. In our taxon-
omy, we can now identify the “types” of deception more formally as infimae species.
Since the purpose of our taxonomy is to identify appropriate game-theoretic models
for each infima species of deception, the specific differences that we use are related to
game theory. (See Table I.) These are the principles of private information Θ, players
P, actions A, and time-horizon T .
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Fig. 13. Intensive deception. The defender alters the same object that is being hidden. In this example, the
defender adds noise to private data.
Fig. 14. Extensive deception. The defender hides an object using other objects in the environment. In this
example, the defender dynamically changes the location of the private data.
4.1.1. Private Information. One of these principles is the private information. To deceive
is to intentionally cause another agent either “to acquire or continue to have a false
belief” or “to be prevented from acquiring or cease to have a true belief” [Mahon 2016].
These two categories are quite different. Figures 11-12 depict both categories. The
first category involves instilling in another a specific falsity (Fig. 11). In the language
of game theory, this requires the creation of a belief. In signaling games or partially
observable stochastic games, agents maintain beliefs over the private information Θ of
other agents. Deceptive actions manipulate these beliefs to create traps or decoys. On
the other hand, the second category of deception involves hiding a true belief (Fig. 12).
This could be employed in cybersecurity to hide a weakness, or it could be deployed
in privacy to protect sensitive information. In either case, the defender maximizes her
utility function by causing attackers to obtain noisy or uncertain information about
the state of reality.
Rothstein and Whaley have distinguised between these two categories as simulation
(or “showing the false”) and dissimulation (or “hiding the real”) [2013]. Under simu-
lation, they include subcategories called masking, repackaging, and dazzling. Under
dissimulation, they include mimicking, inventing, and decoying. While the distinction
between hiding the real and showing the false is appropriate for our purposes, we pre-
fer not to adopt the same subcategories for several reasons. In particular, [Rothstein
and Whaley 2013] includes decoying as a type of “showing the false.” But we prefer
to label it as “hiding the real.” In the literature that we review, decoys are simulated
entities, but they are used mostly to hide the presence of the real entity4.
Therefore, we prefer a new terminology. Biologists distinguish hiding the real and
showing the false using the terms crypsis and mimesis. “In the former... an animal
resembles some object which is of no interest to its enemy, and in doing so is concealed;
in the latter... an animal resembles an object which is well known... and in so doing
becomes conspicuous” [Cott 1940]. We adopt these terms to signify the corresponding
categories of cybersecurity deception.
4The use of decoys pertains to obfuscation (Subsection 3.3). We place technologies such as honeypots (Sub-
section 3.5) in a separate category, because they are designed to attract attacker attention, not simply to
hide the presence of real systems.
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Fig. 15. Tree diagram breakdown of deception into various species. The specific differences correspond to
the game-theoretic notions of private information, actors, actions, and duration. We describe a set of infimae
species called perturbation, moving target defense, obfuscation, mixing, honey-x, and attacker engagement.
4.1.2. Actors. The next specific difference is the set of actors or players P involved in
deception. Based on the actors involved, cryptic deception can be divided into inten-
sive and extensive deception. (See Fig. 13-14.) Intensive deception modifies an actor
(or its own representation) in order to hide it (Fig. 13). For example, some privacy
techniques add noise to data about a user before publishing it. The user’s own data is
modified. By contrast, extensive deception is that category of deception which hides an
actor by using outside actors (Fig. 14). In cyberspace, examples include mix networks
for anonymity. Many messages enter a network, where they are mixed in a chain of
proxy servers before leaving the network. Any given message is hidden because of the
presence of the other messages.
4.1.3. Actions. Deceivers can act in a number of ways, or actions A. Within cryptic
deception, we distinguish between deception that uses information and deception that
uses motion. Deception that uses information tends to manipulate the data released
about agents’ properties, while deception that uses motion either modifies these prop-
erties over time or realizes these properties from a random variable. In other words,
the first category is associated with creating noise, while the second category is asso-
ciated with concepts such as agility and randomization.
4.1.4. Duration. Within mimetic deception, we distinguish between static and dynamic
scenarios. Dynamic games feature multiple interactions, while static games consist
of only one interaction5. Currently, the majority of game-theoretic defensive decep-
tions use static models. The most popular set of mimetic deceptions that are static
are honeypots, honeynets, and honeytokens, to which we refer generically using the
term honey-x. We use the name attacker engagement to denote all forms of mimetic
deception which are dynamic.
4.2. Synthesizing the Taxonomy
Figure 15 uses the specific differences of private information, actors, actions, and du-
ration to create a taxonomy that breaks the genus of deception into multiple levels of
species, ending with the infimae species of perturbation, moving target defense, obfus-
cation, etc. Based on the taxonomy, Table II lists the definitions of each of the infimae
species. The definitions are unambiguous as long as the specific differences are clearly
5Here, we consider one-shot games to be static even if they are not simultaneous-move games.
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Table II. Infimae Species and Definition
Infima Species Definition
Perturbation Cryptic, intensive, informational deception
Moving Target Defense Cryptic, intensive, motive deception
Obfuscation Cryptic, extensive, informational deception
Mixing Cryptic, extensive, motive deception
Honey-X Mimetic, static deception
Attacker Engagement Mimetic, dynamic deception
defined. They are also mutually exclusive, because we have used mutually exclusive
specific differences. Finally, note that the order of application of the specific differences
does not matter. This implies that the taxonomy could be also represented using a bi-
nary lattice in four dimensions, one dimension for each of the specific differences.
4.2.1. Classification of Literature. In the appendix, Table III and Table IV justify the clas-
sification of each paper into its infimae species based on the value of its specific differ-
ences. Most classifications are straightforward. In order to evaluate the structure of
the taxonomy, however, consider several border cases.
First, [Shokri 2015] uses the term “obfuscation,” but we have classified the deception
in this paper as perturbation. Noise is applied to the valuable information itself, so our
taxonomy categorizes it as intrinsic rather than extrinsic. Nevertheless, obfuscation
and perturbation are closely related. If we view each specific difference of an infimae
species as a bit, then we can say that obfuscation and perturbation have a Hamming
distance of one.
Second, consider [Zhu et al. 2012]. The main idea of the paper is to protect valu-
able network traffic by sending external decoy traffic. Therefore, the infimae species
is obfuscation. But the paper also considers mixed strategies, which implement the
agility or motion that is characteristic of moving target defense. Again, obfuscation
and moving target defense have a Hamming distance of one.
A third border case is [Zhang et al. 2010], which studies protection of traffic in the
Tor network. This application is similar to the deceptive routing problems in [Clark
et al. 2012; Zhu et al. 2012], which we have classified as obfuscation. Still, we have
classified [Zhang et al. 2010] as mixing, because Tor requires the participation of other
users in the mix network; therefore, it is extrinsic.
4.2.2. Observed Relationships between Models and Infimae Species. Since our taxonomy dif-
ferentiates species of deception based on game theory, it is interesting to see which
games were used to model each species. Figure 16 lists the papers from Section 3
that study crypsis. Most papers use Nash games and Stackelberg games. The papers
that use Nash games (or related concepts) are listed on an orange background, and
the papers that use Stackelberg games are listed on a blue background. The figure re-
veals that authors do not concur on a one-to-one mapping between species and games.
This is to be expected, since 1) different games capture different aspects of the same
interaction, 2) modeling approaches are still evolving in this nascent field, and 3) the
cybersecurity landscape itself is evolving.
Nevertheless, some trends are evident. These are depicted in Fig. 17. First, all of the
papers on mixing use Nash games or related concepts. (Zhang et al. 2010 uses several
rounds of best-response which is based on the idea of Nash equilibrium.) This is logical,
because each user in a mix network or a mix zone simultaneously decides whether to
participate. A second trend spans both perturbation and obfuscation. Papers which
study user-user interactions are modeled using Nash games (or in one case, a mean-
field game), and papers which study user-adversary interactions are generally modeled
using Stackelberg games. Finally, moving target defense tends to be modeled in two
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Fig. 16. The game-theoretic model is listed for each paper in cryptic deception, in order to compare and
contrast the models used for each infimae species. Parenthetical remarks give reasons for the chosen models.
M
o
ti
v
e
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
al
Intrinsic Extrinsic
Mixing
Nash Games
Perturbation and Obfuscation
Nash games or mean-field games for user-user interactions
Stackelberg games for user-adversary interactions
Moving Target Defense
Games which include 
either mixed strategies or 
Markov decision processes
Fig. 17. Several trends are apparent in the mapping between infimae species and game-theoretic models.
different ways. One way is to use mixed strategies to model randomness in defensive
configurations. The second way is to use Markov decision processes to explicitly model
the temporal component of changing defensive characterizations.
Figures 18-19 list the papers that study mimesis. Papers on the left-hand side study
honey-x (static mimesis), and papers on the right-hand side study attacker engage-
ment (dynamic mimesis). The mapping between deception species and games is not
one-to-one. Honey-x is modeled using two different approaches. One approach uses
signaling games, in order to emphasize the formation of the attacker’s belief about
whether systems are normal systems or honeypots. The other approach uses Bayesian
Nash games. This approach follows along the lines of resource allocation problems, and
obtains an overall network configuration that is optimal for the defender.
The right-hand sides of Fig. 18-19 list three approaches to attacker engagement.
[Zhuang et al. 2010] use a multiple-period game which has a state that reflects in-
formation from past periods. The solution is obtained using dynamic programming.
[Durkota et al. 2015] represent a dynamic network attack using a Markov decision
process. The attacker deploys the whole Markov decision process as a Stackelberg fol-
lower, and the defender places honeypots as a Stackelberg leader. Finally, [Hora´k et al.
2017] use a one-sided partially-observable Markov decision process. This model is per-
haps the closest of the three to a general competitive Markov decision process, in which
a defender and an attacker choose dynamic policies to optimize long-term utility func-
tions [Filar and Vrieze 2012].
4.2.3. Preferred Relationships between Models and Infimae Species. Within these trends,
certain modeling approaches best capture the essential elements of each species of de-
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Fig. 18. The game-theoretic model is listed for each paper in mimetic deception, in order to compare and
contrast the models used for each infimae species.
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Fig. 19. Trends are indicated in each species of mimesis.
ception. Figure 20 depicts these approaches. The root node is non-cooperative games6.
Within non-cooperative games, games with incomplete information are well suited for
mimetic deception, since they can explicitly model the false attacker beliefs that de-
fenders attempt to inculcate. One-shot models such as signaling games model honey-x,
while dynamic models such as partially-observable stochastic games are necessary to
effectively study attacker engagement.
Within cryptic deception, two players are often sufficient to study intensive decep-
tion, in which a single defender attempts to directly deceive an attacker. By contrast,
extensive deception involves multiple defenders who compete against each other in ad-
dition to competing against an attacker. In perturbation and obfuscation, actions often
consist of choosing the variance of noise to add to published data. In mixing and mov-
ing target defense, actions often consist of choosing mixed strategies. Through these
mixed strategies, defenders probabilistically choose routing paths or network configu-
rations.
5. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Our taxonomy and literature survey suggest a number of open challenges and promis-
ing future directions.
5.1. Mimesis
In the papers that we survey, cryptic deception predominates over mimetic deception.
One explanation is that crypsis is the goal of all privacy research. Another explanation
is that the straight-forward technique of randomization falls within the category of
crypsis. Finally, research in mimesis may face greater ethical concerns than in crypsis.
For instance, ought a Chief Information Officer to publish a document which falsely
states the number of data servers that the company runs in order mislead an adver-
6Future research can consider cooperative games, but most current studies use non-cooperative models.
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Fig. 20. Taxonomy with promising modeling approaches overlaid in a hierarchical fashion. For instance,
cryptic, intensive, and motive deception (i.e., moving target defense) can be modeled by non-cooperative,
complete-information, two-player games with mixed strategies. Each of the modeling approaches is shown
in a blurred shape to indicate that alternate approaches are possible.
sary? Clearly, there are some aspects of deception that could infringe on other values
such as trustworthiness. These caveats notwithstanding, more opportunity remains in
mimetic deception.
5.2. Theoretical advances
The vast majority of the papers that we have surveyed use Stackelberg games and
Nash games. Many combine these with rich non-strategic models. For example, [Feng
et al. 2017] combines a Stackelberg game with a Markov decision process, and [Zhu
and Bas¸ar 2013] combines a Stackelberg game with dynamic systems analysis. Few
papers, though, include advanced game-theoretic models. For instance, the literature
that we surveyed did not include any cooperative games. In addition, dynamic games
were not often considered, partly because general stochastic games are fundamentally
difficult to analyze. This may also reflect the relative newness of research in defensive
deception for cybersecurity and privacy—and the application of game theory to this
area.
5.3. Practical implementations
Game theory has been successfully deployed for physical security in several applica-
tions. For instance, [Pita et al. 2008] describes the ARMOR system, which is a game-
theoretic protocol deployed at Los Angeles International Airport. This protocol uses
Stackelberg games. Similarly, [Jain et al. 2010] uses Stackelberg games in order to
optimize the assignment of Federal Air Marshals to U.S. commercial flights. Yet it is
difficult to identify successful implementations of game-theoretic concepts to cyberse-
curity. Of course, it is possible that commercial endeavors use game-theoretic defenses,
but prefer not to publish the results. Still, several challenges frustrate the deployment
of game theory in cybersecurity.
One obstacle is that some cybersecurity professionals may be wary of so-called se-
curity through obscurity, i.e., deceptive security mechanisms that rely only on an at-
tacker’s lack of information. It is true that deceptive mechanisms should be combined
with traditional approaches such as cryptography and access control. In our opinion,
though, game theory provides precisely the right set of tools to offer security profes-
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sionals provable guarantees on what can be achieved by deception. Many game the-
ory models assume that the adversary has full access to the strategy of the defender.
Hence, they obtain worst-case guarantees, and are not undermined if an attacker
learns the defender’s strategy. Indeed, some government organizations have enthu-
siastically adopted deception for cybersecurity. For example, researchers at the Amer-
ican National Security Agency (NSA) recently conducted a series of observed red-team
exercises involving deception. Data collectors monitored the actions and rationale of
the attackers and defenders [Ferguson-Walter et al. 2017]. Such exercises are invalu-
able in making sure that game-theoretic models accurately capture elements of human
psychology.
A second obstacle is, paradoxically, the high demand for technical network security
professionals. Since industry and government organizations have a high demand for
security analysts, and since these analysts need to constantly monitor network traf-
fic, it is challenging to establish collaborations between the analysts and academic
researchers with backgrounds in game theory. This collaboration is crucial in order to
ensure that game theorists solve relevant problems. On the other hand, work in game
theory also offers the possibility to relieve the burden on analysts. For example, game
theory can be used to optimally design IDS alerts in order to limit the number of false
positives that must be analyzed.
5.4. Interdisciplinary Security
Our paper has analyzed deception as a quantitative science. Deception, however, is in-
terdisciplinary. Economics research offers well-developed game-theoretic models. Of-
ten, however, the challenge is to apply these models in accurate, domain-specific ways.
Work in experimental economics emphasizes behavioral or sub-rational aspects of de-
ception. These aspects are critical for applications in which the attacker does not play
the theoretically-optimal strategy. Additionally, psychology can be employed to analyze
attacker preferences and develop accurate threat models. Finally, criminology can be
useful to detect signs of deception by humans. As attacks become increasingly auto-
mated, though, the effectiveness of both psychology and criminology will have to be
reevaluated.
5.5. Conclusion
The next generation of cybersecurity and privacy techniques will leverage tools com-
monly employed by attackers for the purpose of defense. For applications ranging from
protection of civil liberties to network security to defense of the Internet of Battle
Things, defensive deception will play a principal role. We have developed a taxonomy
of defensive deception for cybersecurity and privacy viewed through the lens of game
theory. This taxonomy provides a scientific foundation for future defensive deception
research and a common language that can be used to conceptualize defensive decep-
tion. This work also provides a menu of game-theoretic models and defensive deception
techniques that can be leveraged for future research. Finally, we have summarized
many of the contributions of game theory to the various species of deception over the
past ten years. We hope that these will provide a conceptual basis for the next stage of
research in defensive deception in cybersecurity and privacy.
APPENDIX
Table III and Table IV list our classification justifications for papers in cryptic and
mimetic deception, respectively.
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Table III. Classification Justification for Papers in Cryptic Deception
Authors and Year Category Justification
Chessa et al. 2015 Cryptic The objective is to hide private data.
Intrinsic The private data itself is modified.
Informational Noise is added to a quantity.
Shokri 2015 Cryptic The objective is to hide private data.
Intrinsic The private data itself is modified.
Informational Noise is added to a quantity.
Alvim et al. 2017 Cryptic The objective is to hide private data.
Intrinsic The private data itself is modified.
Informational Noise is added to a quantity.
Theodorakopoulos Cryptic The objective is to hide location.
et al. 2014 Intrinsic The location itself is modified.
Informational Noise is added to the location.
Rass et al. 2017 Cryptic The goal is to hide configuration.
Intrinsic The configuration is centrally-controlled.
Motive The configuration is varied over time.
Sengupta et al. 2018 Cryptic The goal is to hide IDS locations.
Intrinsic The locations are chosen centrally.
Motive The locations are is realized randomly.
Zhu & Bas¸ar 2013 Cryptic The goal is to hide vulnerability locations.
Intrinsic The configuration is centrally-controlled.
Motive The configuration is varied over time.
Feng et al. 2017 Cryptic The goal is to hide a resource configuration.
Intrinsic The configuration is centrally-controlled.
Motive The configuration is varied over time.
Clark et al. 2012 Cryptic The goal is to hide the network traffic path.
Extrinsic Traffic is hidden using other useless traffic.
Informational This uses uncertainty rather than motion.
Zhu et al. 2012 Cryptic The goal is to hide the network traffic path.
Extrinsic Traffic is hidden using other useless traffic.
Informational This uses uncertainty rather than motion.
Pawlick & Cryptic The goal is to hide true user behavior.
Zhu 2016 Extrinsic True behavior is hidden in distracting actions.
Informational This uses uncertainty rather than motion.
Pawlick & Cryptic The goal is to hide true user behavior.
Zhu 2017a Extrinsic True behavior is hidden in distracting actions.
Informational This uses uncertainty rather than motion.
Zhang et al. 2010 Cryptic The goal is to hide entry-exit node pairings.
Extrinsic The mix network relies on other nodes.
Motive Exit and entry nodes are realized randomly.
Freudiger Cryptic The goal is to hide user-pseudonym links.
et al. 2009 Extrinsic Swaps require multiple participants.
Motive Hiding links depends on multiple exchanges.
Lu et al. 2012 Cryptic The goal is to hide user-pseudonym links
Extrinsic Swaps require multiple participants.
Motive Hiding links depends on multiple exchanges.
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Table IV. Classification Justification for Papers in Mimetic Deception
Authors and Year Category Justification
Carroll & Mimetic Honeypots appear to be normal systems.
Grosu 2011 Static The interaction is a one-shot game.
C¸eker et al. 2016 Mimetic Honeypots appear to be normal systems.
Static The interaction is a one-shot game.
Mohammadi Mimetic Honeypots appear to be normal systems.
et al. 2016 Static The interaction is a one-shot game.
Pawlick & Mimetic Honeypots appear to be normal systems.
Zhu 2018 Static The interaction is a one-shot game.
Pı´bil et al. 2012 Mimetic Honeypots appear to be normal systems.
Static The interaction is a one-shot game.
Kiekintveld Mimetic Honeypots appear to be normal systems.
et al. 2015 Static The interaction is a one-shot game.
Zhuang Mimetic Defender types can signal the opposite type.
et al. 2010 Dynamic The game occurs over multiple periods.
Durkota Mimetic Honeypots appear to be normal systems.
et al. 2015 Dynamic Attacks are multi-stage.
Hora´k Mimetic The attacker believes he is undetected.
et al. 2017 Dynamic The game is infinite-horizon.
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